Delegation and Organizational Design by Axel GAUTIER & Dimitri PAOLINI
Delegation and Organizational Design¤
Axel Gautier Dimitri Paolini y
September 2001
¤We would like to thank Francis Bloch, Bernard Caillaud, Jacques Cr¶ emer and Jacques Thisse for their
comments. We also are grateful for the comments by seminar participants at IRES (Louvain-la-Neuve) and Liµ ege.
We are grateful for the ¯nancial support from the Belgian Program on Inter-University Poles of Attraction (PAI
nb. P4/01).
yIRES and UCL, Department of Economics. Place Montesquieu, 3. 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve. Belgium. gau-
tier@ires.ucl.ac.be and paolini@ires.ucl.ac.be
1Delegation and Organizational Design
Abstract
This paper concentrates on the question of organizational design under asymmetric infor-
mation. The design of the organization has two parts: ¯rst, communication channels between
the members should be established and second, the tasks should be allocated to the party that
performs it in the most e±cient way. We show that if the decisions are delegated to the agents,
the agent's decisions reveal the information they have to the principal. Delegation is then a
mechanism to transfer information. Given that delegation is costly, the principal should decide
how many decisions she delegates. In this paper, we show that delegation is only partial. The
agents do not receive power over all decisions and some agents may receive power will the other
will not even if they are identical.
JEL-Classi¯cation codes: D23, D82, L22
Keywords: Delegation, Hierarchy, Asymmetric information
21 Introduction
This paper studies the design of organizations under asymmetric information. We consider
an organization composed of a principal and subordinate agents. The agents have information,
valuable for the organization, that the principal does not have. The organization lasts for several
periods and, at each period, one decision for each agent should be implemented. At ¯rst, the
principal decides of the structure of the organization which governs the process of decision-
making in following periods. The question of organizational design is then to choose who in the
organization will be responsible for the choice of each decisions.
In a world in which contracts are complete, it would make no di®erence to the outcome to
which party is allocated the right to take decisions, since the contract could specify the necessary
actions that should be taken as a function of the relevant circumstances. The question becomes
relevant only if we consider a world in which contracts are incomplete. Therefore, our model in
incomplete contract model in which monetary transfers and communication between parties are
prohibited.1 The responsible of the organization speci¯es only who has the right to undertake
a given action.
Two key features of the model are asymmetric information and externalities. We assume that
there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agents: each agent
possess a piece of private information that the principal does not have. Instead, the principal has
some prior about their distributions. The informational parameters a®ect the preferred action
of all the parties.
We suppose that the decision concerning one agent produces an externality that a®ects
the other agent. The value of these externalities is common knowledge.2 The presence of an
intra-agents externality implies that the preferred project of the principal is not the preferred
project of the agents. The principal cares about the welfare of all the agents, and hence takes
the externality into account while the agents do not. The divergence of interests between the
principal and the agents implies that there will be loss of control associated with delegation.
At the ¯rst stage of the game, the principal has to decide to delegate some power to the
agents or to keep this power for herself.
In a system where the principal keeps all the power for herself, centralization, she can
correct the distortion coming from the externalities but she takes what we call "blind decisions",
decisions that are not contingent on the agents' private information.
In a system where the principal delegates all the power to the agents (decentralization) if,
on the one side, the agents are better informed, on the other side they do not take into account
the impact of their decisions on the welfare of the other agents.3
In between these two systems, centralization and decentralization, there are other organiza-
tions in which decision rights are split between the agents and the principal.4 In these partially
decentralized systems, a new issue arises: the possibility of transferring information from the
1The literature on incomplete contracts has typically focused on the question of which party in a collective
organization should have the right to undertake certain actions as a function of ownership pattern, authority,
institutional agreements, power. See Grossman and Hart (1986), Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Tirole (1999).
2So asymmetry of information is only one-dimensional. Armstrong (1994) deals with the case of delegation to
an agent when the principal ignores the agent's preferences and a state parameter.
3The trade-o® between externality correction (or policy coordination) under centralization and better informed
decision makers under decentralization is at the root of many papers on delegation (Melumad Mookherjee and
Reichelstein (1992), Seabright (1996))
4Like in Aghion and Tirole (1997) when the principal could keep 'formal' authority and delegate 'real' authority
to the agent.
3agent to the principal. By observing the agents' decisions, the principal can improve her prior
about the private information and use this new information to take subsequent decisions (and,
then correct the externalities). Information transfers play a central role in all the partially
decentralized organizations.5;6
A similar problem is found in Riordan and Sappington (1987). It studies the problem of
delegation in a model in which there are two decisions to be taken, but where the ¯rst one is
always done by the agent. After the ¯rst stage, the principal acquires information about the
costs conditions and decide to perform the second stage herself if the correlation between the
costs conditions at the two periods is su±ciently high.
Our ¯rst result is to show that transferring control rights to the agents is a way to transfer
information from the agents to the principal. Delegation is a tool for the principal to extract
the agents' information. When an agent takes a decision, his decision signals the information
he has in hands to the principal.
The optimal organization has the following features: ¯rst, if there is delegation, delegation
is only partial. The principal gives control rights over some decisions to the agents and retains
control over others. Second, the main goal of partial delegation is to extract agents superior
information. Following that, when the principal delegates, she only delegates the ¯rst period
decisions in order to use the information acquired for the subsequent period decisions. Last, the
number of delegated decisions depends on the quality of the signal produced and on the cost of
producing signal. The quality of the signal depends on the correlation between the information
of the agents. The cost of producing a signal, which is the cost of delegating decisions, depends
on the externality exerted by the agent that receives the control over decisions. Following that,
symmetric agents could be treated di®erently in the organization, if one signal, obtained by the
delegation of a decision to one agent, brings enough information to the principal. In these cases,
the agent selected as delegate is the agent that produces the signal at the lower cost. i.e. the
agent that exerts the smallest externality.
We also consider the case in which the agents participate in the design of the organization. We
suppose that the agents can refuse the organization proposed by the principal, and if it is refused,
the organization does not shut down but, instead, the principal centralizes all the decisions.
Participation of the agents imposes additional constraints on the choice of the organization. We
show that the agent that su®ers the largest externality prefers less delegation than what the
principal o®ers, while the agent that su®ers the smallest externality prefers more delegation. The
resulting organization will either be the default point (centralization) or imply more power to
the agents (than what is needed for information transfer) to force the acceptance of the agents.
To illustrate the model, suppose that the principal is the CEO of a multi-product ¯rms and
that the agents are the product managers. Suppose further that the agents have private infor-
mation about their respective markets. If product policies (pricing, quality, ...) are delegated
to managers, they will maximize the value of their divisions, ignoring the consequences of their
choice on other divisions. These externality e®ects could be quite high in the case of substitute
products, where lower prices on one market could decrease the pro¯t in other markets, or in
the case of compatibility standard between the two products. But, if the CEO coordinates all
the policies, she has no access to the information of the agents. Coordination is done at the
cost of having a non-informed decision maker. In this context, mechanisms in which decisions
5There is also a transfer of information under decentralization but the principal has no possibility of using this
information as all decisions are taken by the agents.
6We show that in the absence of information transfers in the partially decentralized organizations, all these
organizations are dominated either by centralization or decentralization.
4are partially delegated could increase the ¯rm value. They have the advantage of transferring
information to the CEO and allow coordination of policies once information is revealed. The
question then, is to choose how much discretion the CEO should leave to the managers. Giving
power has cost in term of policy coordination while retaining too much power may not bring
enough information.
An other potential application is in the study of the federalism system of a country. We
can interpret the principal like the central government, and the agents like regions, where the
information parameter is the regional preferences over policies.
To study the federalist choice, the literature has focused on disparities in the regional pref-
erences, economies of scale in the production of a local public good, on the magnitude of exter-
nalities and spillover e®ects and on the consequences of distortionary local taxation.7
Previous works on decentralization have stressed the advantages of policy coordination when
regions exert externality on each other (Oates, 1972) or the advantages of having diversi¯ed
policies across regions when the citizens can shop around and locate in the agent with the policy
they like the most (Tiebout, 1956).
Following Seabright (1996), many authors (including this paper) study the problem of decen-
tralization in a country where there are inter-regional externalities and asymmetric information.
In Klibano® and Poitevin (1997), for example, each agent is privately informed of the bene¯ts he
gets from the project. In a centralized setting a benevolent, but uninformed, central authority
can impose any project size to the agents. Under decentralization, agents bargain to determine
the project size.8
Our article follow the same line of these articles. It studies the question of costs and bene¯ts
of decentralization when policies have to be implemented in di®erent regions. Di®erently from
the rest of the literature, we go beyond the simple trade-o® between externalities correction
under centralization and informed decision under decentralization and we show that information
transfers are crucial in the choice of the federal system.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we present the model. In section 3,
we describe the decisions taken by the agents and the principal under all possible organizations.
In section 4, we study the optimal organization. In section 5, we extend the model to take the
participation of the agents into account. We conclude in section 6.
2 Model
We consider an organization with a principal and two agents. The organization has to take a
sequence of two decisions. A sequence is important for the question of information transfer.
We model the sequence in the following way: there are two periods and at each period two
decisions should be implemented, one concerning agent A and one concerning agent B. We call
dl
i, i =1 ; 2, l = A;B, the decision taken at period i for agent l. The decisions are chosen
either by the principal or by the agents. The allocation of power is written in the organization
structure (constitution).
2.1 Timing of events
The timing of the game is represented by the following sequence of events:
7See the survey by Oates (1991).
8See also Ellingsen (1998).
5Stage 1: design of the organization
² The principal designs the organization.
² It speci¯es who is in charge of decisions dl
1 and dl
2, l = A;B.
Stage 2: decisions
² The agents acquire some private information.
² The ¯rst decisions dl
1 are taken (and observed).
² The second decisions dl
2 are taken.
² Payo®s are collected.
2.2 Design of the organization
At stage 1, the principal writes down an organizational design that allocates decision right
over decisions dl
1 and dl
2 either to the agents or to herself. The organizational design is viewed
as an incomplete contract: decisions rights are allocated but the organizational design cannot
constraint the choice of the decisions. We also assume that monetary transfers between the
principal and the agents or between agents are prohibited.
If we do not consider organization in which decision dA
i is delegated to agent B and vice-versa,
we have 16 possible organization structures:






1. c c c c
2. d d d d
3. d c d c
4. c d c d
5. d c c c
6. c c d c
7. c d c c
8. c c c d
9. c d d d
10. d c d d
11. d d c d
12. d d d c
13. d c c d
14. c d d c
15. d d c c
16. c c d d
c = the decision is taken by the principal
d = the decision is taken by the agent
Table 1: possible organizations
62.3 Decision stage
At the decision stage, decisions are taken according to the organizational design. As we consider
an incomplete contract model, the parties in charge of the decisions have complete discretion in
their choices.
An important feature of the decision stage is asymmetric information between the principal
and the agents.
2.3.1 Environmental parameter
We suppose that each agent has a piece of information that the principal does not have. This in-
formation is valuable for the organization as it a®ects the preferred projects of the organization's
members.
The information of the agents is represented by a parameter µ. The value of µ determines the
preferred projects of the agents and the principal. We could interpret indi®erently µ as either
economic conditions that a®ect the cost of implementing a given project or as a parameter
a®ecting the preferences of the agents over projects.
Each agent has one information µA and µB. Nevertheless, we suppose that each µ is drawn
out of a common set £ = fµ1;µ 2gwith µ1 <µ 2and we call ¢µ the di®erence µ2 ¡ µ1.
The agents know the value of µ while the principal only knows the prior distribution. The
distribution of (µA;µB) is represented by a joint probability distribution over £ £ £. The joint
distribution of types on the set £££i sf v 11;v 12;v 21;v 22g where vij = proba(µA = µi;µB =µ j).
Correlation is not perfect if v12 and v21 di®ers from zero.9
2.3.2 Decisions
The choice of a decision (dl
i) represents the choice of a project implemented by the organization.
The project di®ers only in one dimension. We suppose that there is a continuum of possible
policies ]0;+1): In a multi-products ¯rm, the decisions represent the price of each product.
2.3.3 Welfare functions
The agents and the principal have one preferred decision which depends on the informational
parameter.10 Their utility is a quadratic function of the distance between the preferred decision
and the actual decision. In addition to this, each agent exerts an externality on the other. This
means that the decision of agent A a®ects the utility of agent B and vice-versa.




























To each decision is associated a linear bene¯t and quadratic cost. The cost being function
9Except the case of perfect negative correlation when v11 =0=v 22.
10The preferred project d1 is the same as the preferred project d2. We assume that the projects have the same
importance (for example d1 and d2 are the same decisions taken at two di®erent times).
7of µ. Linear bene¯ts and quadratic costs imply that the utility reaches a unique maximum for
dl
i = ®l + µ, i =1 ;2, l = A;B which is agent's preferred project.
The externality11 exerted by one agent on the other is linear and measured by the parameters
° and ». We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 °2 ¸ »2
Having an agent that exerts a larger externality than the other (agent B under this assump-
tion) a®ects the organizational choice and particularly the choice of one delegate under partial
delegation.
The aim of the principal is to maximize the total welfare which is the sum of the agents'
utility:
UP = UA + UB
2.3.4 First best




2 ( µ A )=® A+µ A¡° (1)
dB
1 (µB)=d B
2 ( µ B )=® B+µ B¡» (2)
The selected organizational design by the principal will be the one that gives the highest welfare,
the one for which the decisions are closest to the ¯rst best.
Before going to the choice of the optimal organization, we describe in the next section the
decisions of the principal and the agents under the 16 possible organizational structures.
3 Decisions of the principal and the agents
At the decision stage, decisions are taken according to the organizational design. The principal
decisions depend on the information she has on the parameters µ. In an incomplete contract
setting, where communication is not feasible, the only information the principal could have come
from the observation of the decisions delegated to the agents.
3.1 Decisions of the principal
Suppose, for a while, that the decisions of the agents perfectly signal their information to the
principal (we will prove that it is indeed the case in proposition 1). From this point of view,
delegating decisions is a way to transfer information from the agents to the principal. If she has
delegated no decisions (centralization), the principal receives no information.12 If the principal
delegates dl
1 to both agents, she has two pieces of information while if she has delegated only dl
1
to agent l, the principal has one piece of information. We analyze in turn these three cases.
11That could be positive or negative.
12It would also be the case if the principal delegates but the agents pool on their decisions. In this case, the
observation of the agents' decisions does not increase the information of the principal.
83.1.1 The Principal has received no signal
If the principal has no signal, she bases her decisions on the expected value of µ (Eµ) rather
than on its true value. But the principal internalizes the externalities imposed by one agent to
the other. The decisions that maximize uninformed principal's welfare are:
dA
1 = dA
2 = ®A +( v 11 + v21)µA
1 +( v 21 + v22)µA
2 ¡ » (3)
dB
1 = dB
1 = ®B +( v 11 + v12)µB
1 +( v 12 + v22)µB
2 ¡ ° (4)
3.1.2 The Principal has received two signals
When the principal has a signal over both states of the world, she will take the ¯rst best
decisions (given by equations 1 and 2) for both agents. With two pieces of information, the
principal implements the ¯rst best in period 2.
3.1.3 The Principal has received one signal
If the principal delegates dl
1 to agent l, and if dl
1 signals µl to the principal, the principal becomes
informed about µl but also improves her information about µk, k 6= l if there is correlation
between the information.
With one signal obtained by delegating dl
1, the principal implements the ¯rst best in period
2 for agent l and bases her decision dk
2 on a better information than the prior distribution of µk.
For example, if the principal delegates just dA
1 to agent A, she becomes informed about µA.
She does not become informed about µB but improves the prior distribution of µB. The posterior
distribution of µB given that the principal has observed dA
1 (µ)i s :
¹ ( µ B=µ 1j µ A=µ 1)= v 11
v11+v12
¹(µB = µ2jµA = µ1)= v 12
v11+v12
¹(µB = µ1jµA = µ2)= v 21
v21+v22
¹(µB = µ2jµA = µ2)= v 22
v21+v22
Table 2: Posterior distribution of µB after receiving a perfect signal over µA.
And hence, with one signal received from agent A, the principal takes the decisions d2 given by:
dA
2 (µ)=® A + µ ¡ » (5)
dB






µ2 ¡ °: (6)
dB






µ2 ¡ °: (7)
With one signal received from agent A, the principal implements the decision dA
2 that corre-
sponds to the ¯rst best, and a decision dB
2 closer to the ¯rst best than an non-informed principal
(if there is correlation between the µs). And the decision dB
2 is closer to the ¯rst best, the higher
is the correlation between the two parameters µA and µB. In the limit case of perfect correlation
(µA = µB), one signal is enough to implement the ¯rst best in period 2.
93.2 Agents decisions
Now we analyze the choice of the agents when they receive control rights. If the agents take
a decision that di®ers when µ di®ers, the principal can acquire information about their private
information. If, on the contrary, they take the same decision whatever µ, the principal learns
nothing by observing agents decisions. When the agents choose a decision, they also choose
which information they want to transfer to the principal.
3.2.1 The agent l has control over dl
2
Consider ¯rst the cases in which the agent has control right over the decision d2. As the game
will end after the choice of d2, the agent will select his preferred project:
dl
2(µl)=® l+µ l (8)
3.2.2 The agent l has control over dl
1
Now consider the cases in which the agent has control right over d1. Two situations should be
distinguished: those in which the information transferred by the agent could be used by the
principal and those in which information transfer plays no role.
Information transfer matters only if the principal could use the information to take subse-
quent decisions. This is the case when d1 is delegated to one or two agents and there is some d2
chosen by the principal.13
In all the other cases, even if the principal learns something by observing a decision taken
by the agent, she has no possibility to use it. When information transfer does not matter, the
agents will therefore select the decisions that corresponds to their preferred projects:
dl
1(µl)=® l+µ l (9)
In all these cases, where there is no issue of transferring information, delegating a decision
already has advantages: the decision taken by the agent is based on the true value of µ rather
than on its expected value, but delegation is also costly because the externality is not taken into
account by the person in charge of the decision (this is also the case when d2 is delegated).
Now we turn to the organization structures where information transfer matters. When one
agent decides in the ¯rst period and the principal has some power in period 2, he anticipates
that he could transfer information to the principal with his decision, and he will make a strategic
decision that maximizes his welfare in both periods.
The game played by the agent and the principal is a signalling game, where the choice of dl
1
is used by the principal to extract information. As equilibrium concept we use the Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium and we apply the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) to re¯ne the set
of equilibria.
The following proposition constitutes a key element when we deal with delegation of a deci-
sion.
Proposition 1 Under delegation of dl
1, the only equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion
is the least costly separating equilibrium.
13This is the case in organizations 3, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16.
10Proof. See appendix A
The reasoning behind the proof of proposition 1 is the following. Consider a pooling equilib-
rium in which an agent selects the same decision whatever his private information. The fact that
both types select the same decision implies that, if the principal is in charge of d2, she will not be
informed14, and hence the decisions will be those of an uninformed principal. And this implies
a utility loss for the agent in state µ2 (in the case °;» > 0). We apply the intuitive criterion to
show that the agent in state µ2 could deviate from the pooling decision to another decision that
signals his type. The type of agent that su®ers from pooling can switch to another decision and
thereby signal his type. And hence, no pooling equilibria survive the intuitive criterion.
Applied to the separating equilibria, the intuitive criterion selects as sole surviving equilib-
rium, the least costly separating equilibrium.
Proposition 1 implies that delegation of d1 is a way for the principal to acquire information.15
To simplify the analysis, we make the following hypothesis:
Assumption 2 ¢µ2 ¸ °2




In the signalling game literature, this type of equilibrium is called free lunch signals equilibrium
when selecting his preferred decision is enough for the agent to signal his type.16
We could summarize the previous discussion by establishing that under assumption 2, when
the agents receive control right, they will select their preferred project, and this choice reveals
their information to the principal.
4 Optimal organization
Delegating decisions has advantages as well as costs. If the principal delegates a decision to
one of the agents, this decision is taken by an informed party, but the agent does not take the
externality he exerts into account. Moreover, by observing the decision taken by the agent, the
principal gets one piece of information and could use it if she has to take other decisions. The
decision to delegate or not will be based on a trade-o® between the value of information and the
cost linked to the externality.
4.1 Perfect correlation
To start with the problem of the optimal organization, we will assume perfect correlation between
the preferences of the two agents.
Assumption 3 v12 = v21 =0
14Or imperfectly informed if d1 was also delegated to the other agent and that decision signals the other agent's
information.
15If it was not the case, the principal is better o® if she keeps control right over all decisions, as she could take
the externality into account. If the principal anticipates that the agents will not transfer information, there will
be no delegation at all in these cases.
16Indeed, when assumption 2 is not satis¯ed, the principal prefers centralization to delegation (see after propo-
sitions 2 and 3)
11The distribution of types is then represented by probabilities v1 and v2 =1¡v 1, which are the
probability that µ = µ1 and µ = µ2.
In the case of perfect correlation, one signal is enough for the principal to be informed about
the preferences of both agents. And only one piece of information is necessary to implement
the ¯rst best decisions for both agents in period 2. If we just concentrate on the problem of
information transfer, there is no need to duplicate the production of signals by delegating more
than one decision.
As both agents produce signals of the same quality, the principal should delegate the decision
to the agent that produces the signal at the lowest possible cost. The cost of producing a signal
is, for the principal, the fact that, when a decision is delegated, the agent does not take the
externality into account. The cost of producing one signal is then the cost of not taking into
account the externality.17 And hence, the signal is produced at the lowest cost if the decision is
delegated to the agent that exerts the smallest externality (agent A if ° ¸ »).
But if the principal delegates just dA
1 to agent A, only three decisions are taken on the basis
of the true information, one decision, dB
1 , is still taken by a non informed principal. While
if the principal delegates the ¯rst decision to both agents, all the decisions are taken by an
informed party but the externality is not taken into account in period one. And hence, the
decision to delegate a second decision depends on the trade o® between the value of having an
informed decision maker and the cost of having no externality correction for that decision. For
this reason, delegating the ¯rst decision to both agents may still be optimal even if the second
signal is useless.
From the previous discussion, it becomes clear that there are only three organizations18
worth to be considered: centralization, delegation of dA
1 to agent A and delegation of dA
1 and dB
1
t oAa n dB .
Under perfect correlation, the optimal organization is given in the following proposition and
represented hereafter in ¯gure 1.
Proposition 2 The optimal organization is: centralization for v1v2¢µ2 <
»2
3 , delegation of
dA





, and delegation of dA
1 and dB
1 to agent A and B for
v1v2¢µ2 >° 2




Centralization Delegation to A and B Delegation to
Agent A
Figure 1: Optimal organization under perfect correlation.
In a technical point of view, proposition 2 is easy to understand: when a decision is based
on the expected value of µ rather than on its true value, the welfare is reduced by v1v2¢µ2,
but when a decision is corrected for the externality, the welfare is increased by »2 or °2.I fw e
compare delegation of dA
1 and centralization, three decisions are based on the true value of µ (all
but dB
1 ) but the externality for B is not corrected because agent A selects his preferred decision
17When the externality is not taken into account for one decision, the utility of the principal is reduced (com-
pared to the ¯rst best) by »
2 or °
2.
18In the case where ° = », we have also to consider delegation of d
B
1 to agent B.
12dA
1 . Delegating dA
1 dominates centralization if: 3v1v2¢µ2 ¸ »2. When we compare delegation of
dA
1 and delegation of dA
1 and dB
1 , there is one more decision is based on µ rather than Eµ but the
externality is not corrected for dB
1 . hence, delegation of dA
1 only is optimal if: v1v2¢µ2 · °2.
An important consequence of proposition 2, is that symmetric agents will be treated asym-
metrically within the organization. The principal will select one delegate that will be responsible
for the production of the signal and keeps control of the decisions concerning the other agents.19
The delegate selected by the principal will be the agent that exerts the smallest externalities on
the others.20 The delegate is the agent that has the preferences closest to those of the principal.
Following this result, delegation is limited within organizations. There is only one agent that
receives control rights, and delegation is limited to ¯rst period decisions. Delegation is limited
because a major features of delegation is signal production.21 The optimal organization is the
organization that transfers information at the lowest possible cost. The possible duplication of
signal, when it is optimal to delegate d1 to both agents, is due to the fact that the production
of a second signal by agent B, signal that is useless in term of information transfer, may make
the decision dB
1 closest to the ¯rst best than in the absence of it. This case appears when infor-
mation has a great value (¢µ is large). The delegation of a second decision depends on a simple
trade-o® between the bene¯t of an informed decision maker and the value of the externality,
without considering any bene¯ts linked to information transfer.
Now we turn to the case of imperfect correlation between the preferences of the agents to
check the robustness of this result.
4.2 Imperfect correlation
When correlation is not perfect, the distribution of preferences is given by a joint distribution
fv11;v 12;v 21;v 22g over £££. We will measure correlation by a parameter ½ = jv11v22¡v12v21j.
To simplify expressions we will assume that: v11 = v22 = vii and v12 = v21 = vij. Our correlation
measures can be rewritten as: ½ = jv2
ii ¡ (1
2 ¡ vii)2j = jvii ¡ 1
4j. The correlation parameter ½
takes value in between 0 (no-correlation) and 1
4 (perfect correlation).
With imperfect correlation, one piece of information is not enough to implement the ¯rst
best decision for both agents in period 2. By delegating just dl
1, the principal only revises her
prior about µk. The quality of the signal produced by the agent when one decision is delegated
depends on the degree of correlation. When correlation is high, the decision dk
2 implemented
by the principal after she had observed dl
1 is close to the ¯rst best, while when ½ is small, the
decision is close to the decision of an uninformed principal. In the two agents case, the quality
of the signal does not depend on the choice of the delegate.22 And hence, if the principal prefers
to have only one piece of information, she will delegate d1 to the agent that produce the signal
at the lowest cost.
To implement the ¯rst best in period two, the principal needs two pieces of information
i.e delegate the ¯rst decision to both agents. When the principal duplicates the production of
signals, there is now a bene¯t in term of information transfer. The need of two signals rather
19This result extends to organizations with N agents.
20In the case of perfectly symmetric agents (° = »), A or B could be chosen indi®erently as delegate.
21In the absence of information transfer, there are no bene¯ts associated with delegation.
22The main di®erence between this framework and the N>2 agents case is that with two agents, both are
as able to produce a signal of a given quality and hence, when the principal delegates, she selects the delegate
that produce the signal at the lowest cost. In the N agents framework, some agents may have a higher ability to
produce signal. Those agents not necessary be the agents that produce the signal at the lowest cost. Therefore,
the choice of delegate(s) depends on their ability to produce signal, and the signal production cost (externality).
13than one will depends on the quality of the signal (½).
When the principal has no pieces of information (centralization) or two pieces of informa-
tion (delegation of d1 to both agents), correlation plays no role and the decisions are identical
whatever the value of ½. Correlation only matters when the principal has only one piece of
information (delegation of dA
1 or dB
1 ).
As in the case of perfect correlation, there are only three organizations that worths to be
considered: centralization, delegation of dA
1 and delegation of dA
1 and dB
1 . We already established
in appendix B that centralization dominates delegation of dA
1 and dB
1 if: ¢µ2 · °2 + »2.
By comparing the principal's welfare in the two situations, we can show that delegation of
dA
1 dominates centralization if:
(1 + 8½2)¢µ2 ¸ 2»2
and delegation of dA
1 dominates delegation of d1 to both agents if:
2°2 ¸ (1 ¡ 8½2)¢µ2
And the following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 3 The optimal organization is: centralization for ¢µ2 ·
2»2
1+8½2, delegation of dA
1




1¡8½2] and delegation of dA
1 and dB








Centralization Delegation to A and B Delegation to
Agent A
Figure 2: Optimal organization under imperfect correlation.
Proposition 3 looks similar to proposition 2. The main di®erence is that the parameter
space where the optimal organization is to delegate just dA
1 now depends on the quality of the
signal send by the agent. When correlation decreases, the quality of the signal send by agent A
decreases and hence, delegating just one decision brings a lower utility. This fact is summarized
in the corollary:
Corollary 1 When ½ decreases, the parameter space in which delegating just dA











1+8½2 is always smaller than
°2
1¡8½2, and so there is always a parameter space in
which delegating dA
1 is optimal except in the limit case where ½ = 0 and ° = ».

















14Figure 3: Optimal organization under imperfect correlation.
The results of proposition 2 seem to be robust. When one considers that the agents do
not have the same information, and hence cannot transmit two information with one signal,
delegation remains limited to ¯rst period decisions. The choice of delegating d1 t oo n eo rt w o
agents depends on the importance of the externality and the quality of the signal.
5 Agents participation in the design of the organization
So far, we have only discussed the principal's preferred organization. In this section, we discuss
the cases in which the agents participate, together with the principal, in the choice of the orga-
nizational structure. In many organizations, the design of the organization is not imposed by
one party but results from an agreement between organization's members with con°icting inter-
ests.23 The choice and the e±ciency of an organization depends on who decides the repartition
of control rights.24
Participation of the agents in the design of the organization can be done in a variety of ways.
Here we will assume that the principal still design the organization, but to be implemented, the
proposed organization should be accepted by both agents. The proposed organization will be
rejected if one of the agents rejects it.25
If one agent refuses the principal's proposal, the proposed organization is not applied, and
the default point is centralization.26 The agents will accept the organization proposed by the
principal if their utility is at least as big as in the centralization case.
Another important point is that the agents accept or refuse the organization before they
learn the value of µ. For Aghion and Bolton (1992) and La®ont (1999), the allocation of power
in the constitution is done without knowing the conditions under which decisions will be taken.
We make a similar hypothesis an consider that the design of the organization takes place under
symmetric but incomplete information. And hence, the principal cannot learn anything by
observing the acceptance of the agents27 and the only signal the principal could have come from
delegation of d1 to agent(s).
When agents participate in the design of the organization, the ¯rst stage of the game is
modi¯ed in the following way:
Stage 1: design of the organization
² The principal designs the organization.
² It speci¯es who is in charge of decisions dl
1 and dl
2, l = A;B.
23Regions in the choice of a constitution (Alesina and Spolaore (1997)), unions in the case of ¯rms.
24In Alesina and Spolaore, there is too much decentralization (too many countries) when the countries have the
power to determine their size.
25The unanimity rule necessary could be justi¯ed by the strong interdependence between the decisions of agents
A and B. In the choice of the optimal organization, we cannot separate the choice to delegate decision(s) to A and
to B. For example delegating just d
A
1 is not equivalent for agent B to centralization, as the decisions d
A di®ers
in the two organizational modes. If the organization should be accepted with a simple majority (one agent and
the principal or the two agents), there are no cases in which the principal's proposed organization described in
proposition 3 is refused.
26Assuming that the default point is centralization is convenient to study the conditions that leads to the
decentralization of a (previously) centralized organization.
27There is no learning by refusal as in La®ont and Martimort (1997).
15² The agents accept or reject the proposed organization.
The organization is accepted if there is unanimity.
If it is rejected, centralization is applied.




1 . The following lemmas describe when these two organizations are accepted by the
agents.
Lemma 1 Agent A always accepts delegation of dA
1 .
Agent A accepts delegation of dA
1 and dB
1 only if:
¢µ2 ¸ 4°2 ¡ 2»2
Proof. See appendix C
Compared to centralization, agent A always prefers delegation of dA
1 . But if in addition, the
principal also delegates dB
1 to agent B, this is refused by agent A if the externality he su®ers from
agent B is large. The principal would like to delegate d1 to both agents if ¢µ2 ¸
2°2
1¡8½2.B u ta s
2 ° 2
1 ¡ 8 ½ 2 is smaller than 4°2 ¡ 2»2 whatever ½28, the principal could not implement delegation of
dA
1 and dB
1 when ¢µ2 2 [
°2











Figure 4 : Optimal organization refused by agent A





Agent B accepts delegation of dA
1 and dB
1 only if:
¢µ2 ¸ 4»2 ¡ 2°2
Proof. See appendix C
Delegation of dA
1 and dB
1 is not a problem for agent B. When the principal prefers this
solution, agent B accepts it: 4»2 ¡ 2°2 ·
2°2
1¡8½2 8½.
If ½ = 0, agent B is always better o® under centralization than with delegation of dA
1 . When ½
increases, the signal of agent A has a higher quality and agent is more likely to accept delegation
of d1 to agent A. However, even with perfect correlation, there are still values of ¢µ2 for which
agent B refuses delegation of dA







1¡8½ 2)]. This is represented in ¯gure 5.






1¡8½ 2)] [ [
2°2
1¡8½2;4°2 ¡ 2»2], the optimal organization of
proposition 3 is refused by one agent. Now we concentrate on the choice of an organization that
is not refused by the agents for those parameters only.
28Except in the limit case of perfect correlation ½ =
1













Figure 5 : Optimal organization refused by agent B
The agents A and B have a completely di®erent attitude toward the proposed organization
of the principal. Agent A, that su®ers the largest externality, prefers less delegation than what
the principal o®ers, while agent B prefers more delegation. Agent A accepts an organization
where he controls dA
1 if the principal controls dB
1 , while agent B accepts an organization where
dA
1 is delegated to A only if he also receives control over dB
1 .
To solve this puzzle, the principal has two solutions, either she delegates less (centralization),
or she delegates more. Delegating less is not a problem because it corresponds to the default
point and therefore is always accepted by the agents. If the principal wants to delegate dA
1 ,s h e
has also to delegate dB
1 in order to be accepted by B. But then it is refused by A. To be accepted
by A, the principal can give more power to agent A, by delegating also dA
2 . By delegating more to
A, the principal can 'buy' the acceptance of A. When the optimal organization is rejected by the
agents the principal delegates either nothing or all decisions but dB
1 . Proposition 4 summarizes
this fact.
Proposition 4 For ¢µ2 2 D, when at least one agent refuses the organization of proposition 3,
it is optimal to delegate delegate dA
1 , dB
1 and dA
2 if (i) both agents accept it and (ii) ¢µ2 ¸ 2»2+°2.
Otherwise, centralization is optimal.
For ¢µ2 outside D, the optimal organization is the same as in proposition 3




by both agents are also discussed in appendix D.
Participation of the agents in the design of the organization has three consequences. First, the
overall e±ciency decreases. As we add participation constraints on the choice of the principal,
when these constraints are relevant, the organization is less e±cient. The e±ciency loss are
unequally distributed among agents. There is one agent that increases his utility while the
utility of the other decreases. Participation in the organizational design cannot bene¯t to both
agents. Second, the agent that su®ers the largest externality may receive more power. This
agent wants less delegation than what the principal proposes. And hence, to accept delegation,
the principal should o®er him more power. Third, participation of the agent in the process
of organization design process, leads either to less delegation, when the principal retains all
the control rights or to more delegation when the principal delegates three decisions instead
of one or two. If we measure the degree of decentralization by the number of decisions out of
the principal control, the agent participation implies either a greater agent control or a greater
principal control.
6 Conclusions
This model sheds lights on one major determinant of the organizational structure: the role of
information transfers between the di®erent level of the organization. If information is perfectly
shared among all the members, the assignment of tasks to the agent who is able to perform it
17at the lowest possible cost is an easy problem. When information is spread among the members
of the organization, the design of the organization has two parts: ¯rst tasks should be allocated
to the agent that do it in the most e±cient way and second, the organization should organize
communication channel to transfer information to the agent that needs it.29
In this paper, we have shown that a way to transfer information from the subordinates to the
responsible of the organization is to delegate decisions. When delegation is used as a commu-
nication channel, the optimal organization is partially delegated. In this kind of organizations,
power is not concentrated in the hand of one person but rather split between the agents and the
principal.
In these partially decentralized organization, agents have 'real' authority30 over decisions.
Under the incomplete contract hypothesis, that implies that decisions cannot be contracted for,
agents have discretion in the choice of their decisions. The source of power of the subordinate is
their information. Delegation takes its roots in asymmetric information within the organization.
We have shown that, in addition to the bene¯ts of a better informed decision maker under
delegation, it also has the advantage of channelling information to the top of the organization.
A Proof of proposition 1
The proof of proposition 1 is standard and is directly derived from Cho and Kreps (1987). Cho
and Kreps de¯ne the intuitive criterion in the following way:
A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion if the equilibrium payo® of the agent in
one state of the world (µi) is greater with the equilibrium strategy than with any other strategy.
And it exists a strategy ~ s such that the equilibrium payo®s in the other state of the world (µj)
are smaller than those with the strategy ~ s once the principal is convicted that ~ s could not have
been chosen by the agent in state µi.
To proof proposition 1, we ¯rst describe the equilibria in the signalling game. An equilibrium
consists in a collection of decisions taken by the agents and the principal according to the
organizational structure and beliefs of the principal, beliefs that should be consistent with the
Baye's rule. Once the equilibria are computed, we apply the intuitive criterion.
To understand the proof, two key elements have to be mentioned. First, the decisions taken
by agent l do not a®ect the decisions taken by the other agent. To understand this, consider an
organization where d1 is delegated to agents A and B. Suppose that the decision of the agent
B signals some information to the principal. The principal uses this information to take the
decision dB
2 . This decision a®ects the payo®s of A through the externality. But for agent A,
there is no possibility to modify dB
2 by sending more or less of information. And hence, the
decisions taken by B a®ect the payo®s of A but not his decisions. Therefore, we can view the
signalling game as two separated games between one agent and the principal. Second, when
the externalities °, » are positive, the agents always prefers that the principal takes a decision
smaller than the ¯rst best decision.31 In other words, the agents prefer that the principal corrects
as little as possible for the externality. A direct consequence of this is that the agent in state µ1
always prefers that the principal becomes informed about the state of the world. While in state
29Radner (1993) and Dewatripont and Bolton (1994) show that the structure of an organization is chosen in
order to minimize the costs of proceeding and transferring the information from the subordinates to the top. The
resulting structure is typically a pyramid with multiple levels in the hierarchy.
30Aghion and Tirole (1997).
31In the case of negative externalities, the agents prefer decisions greater than the ¯rst best decisions and the
reasoning is the same.
18µ2, the agent may prefer that the principal do not become informed or becomes only partially
informed.
Result 1 No pooling equilibria survives the intuitive criterion.
Consider any pooling equilibrium. The agent in state µ1 is worse-o® than in the case where he
could signal his type.32
We can show that to any pooling equilibrium, we can associate a decision ~ d1 such that:
(i) In state µ2, the agent prefers the pooling equilibrium to ~ d1, whatever the beliefs associated
with ~ d1
(ii) In state µ1, the agent prefers ~ d1 to the pooling equilibrium if the principal is convicted that
¹(µ1j~ d1)=0 .
Then if in state µ2 the agent never deviates to ~ d1, the intuitive criterion imposes that the
beliefs associated with ~ d1 changes to ¹(µ1j~ d1) = 1. And consequently, the agent will quit the
p o o li ns t a t eµ 1and no pooling equilibria survive the intuitive criterion.
Result 2 The only separating equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion is the least costly
separating equilibrium (Riley outcome).
In a separating equilibrium, the agent implement is preferred decision in state µ1. An equilibrium
is separating if dl
1(µ1)¤ = ®l + µ1 and dl
1(µ2)¤ satis¯ed the following incentive constraint (IC):
Ul(d1(µ1)¤;d 2(µ 1)=® l+µ 1;µ 2)·Ul(d 1(µ 2) ¤;d 2(µ 2)=® l+µ 2;µ 2)( IC)
From the constraint (IC), we can derive the set of separating equilibria (call this set D). These
equilibria are supported by pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs: ¹(µ2jdl
1 6= dl
1(µ2)¤)=0 .
The intuitive criterion applied to the set D of separating equilibria will re¯ne all the out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. These updated beliefs become ¹(µ2jdl
1 2 D) = 1. And hence a rational agent
selects the decision dl
1(µ2) that maximizes Ul under the constraint (IC) i.e selects his preferred
decision within D. This decision is the agent preferred project in state µ2 if »;° · ¢µ.
B Proof of proposition 2
UP(delegationdA




1 ) ¡ UP(delegationdA
1 anddB
1 ) > 0 , v1v2¢µ2 <° 2
U P( delegationdA
1 anddB
1 ) ¡ UP(centralization) > 0 , v1v2¢µ2 >° 2+» 2
32Except in the case of perfect correlation where v12 = v21 = 0 and the principal has received a signal from the
other agent. In this case, there is no reason for the agent to pool on d
l
1.
19C Proof of lemmas 1 and 2
UA(delegationdA
1 ) ¡ UA(centralization)=
1
4
(¢µ2 +2 » 2)>0
UA( delegationdA
1 anddB
1 ) ¡ UA(centralization)=
1
4
(¢µ2 +2 » 2¡4 ° 2)
UB( delegationdA
1 ) ¡ UB(centralization)=2 ½ 2¢ µ 2¡» 2
U B( delegationdA
1 anddB
1 ) ¡ UB(centralization)=
1
4
(¢µ2 +2 ° 2¡4 » 2)
D Proof of proposition 4
For the principal, delegation of dA
1 , dB
1 and dB




2 ) ¡ UP(centralization) > 0 , ¢µ2 > 2»2 + °2
Agent A accepts the delegation of the three decisions if:
¢µ2 ¸ 4°2 ¡ 4»2
And Agent B accepts if:
¢µ2 ¸ 8»2 ¡ 2°2
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